University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Volume 28
1995

Professional Responsibility and Choice of Law: A Client-Based
Alternative to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
Colin Owyang
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr
Part of the Jurisdiction Commons, Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons, and the
Legal Profession Commons

Recommended Citation
Colin Owyang, Professional Responsibility and Choice of Law: A Client-Based Alternative to the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, 28 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 459 (1995).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr/vol28/iss2/6

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform at
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND CHOICE
OF LAW: A CLIENT-BASED ALTERNATIVE TO
THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Colin Owyang*
Because of the increasingly interstate nature of legal practice
during the past few decades, practitioners licensed in multiple
jurisdictions have been forced more frequently to confront choice-oflaw dilemmas in the area of professional responsibility. Although
most states have adopted fairly uniform regulations on professional
ethics, only the recently amended American Bar Association's Model
Rules of Professional Conduct contain a specific provision that
addresses the choice-of-law problem in the professional responsibility context. This Note outlines certain ethical considerations facing
the multistate practitioner and argues that the choice-of-law
provision in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides
insufficient clarity and predictability where a lawyer must determine ex ante which state's professional responsibility regulations
will apply to his actions. Specifically, this Note focuses on the
future crime exception to the attorney-client privilege, discussing
how the historical motivations for the privilege overlap with the
prophylactic goals of the professional responsibility regulations-both purport to protect the legally unsophisticated client
from the intricacies of the adversarial system and its agents. This
Note accordingly proposes a client-based alternative to the choiceof-law provision in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
holding multistate practitioners accountable to the professional responsibility regulations of the state in which the client is domiciled.
The proposed solution admittedly involves certain sacrifices and
potential complications. In comparison to the current choice-of-law
provision, however, the client-based rule provides a more certain
and rational means of resolving choice-of-law dilemmas for the
multistate practitioner in the area of professional responsibility.

INTRODUCTION

Since the 1970s, the multistate, or interstate, practice oflaw
has become significantly more common. 1 With the increasing
•
Executive Editor, Uniuersity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Volume
29, 1995. B.A. 1991, M.A. 1993, Yale University; J.D. 1995, University of Michigan
Law School. I would like to thank Professors Mathias Reimann and Nick Rine for
their patience and guidance. I would also like to thank Paul Cimino and Aubry
Smith for their helpful comments and suggestions.
1.
Duncan T. O'Brien, Multistate Practice and Conflicting Ethical Obligations,
16 SETON HALL L. REV. 678, 678 (1986) (citing Samuel J. Brakel & Wallace D. Loh,
Regulating the Multistate Practice of Law, 50 WASH. L. REv. 699, 699 (1975)).
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sophistication of corporate entities, the greater complexity of
commercial transactions, the pervasive application of federal
law, and the varied state adoption of model codes and acts,
attorneys who practice in multiple jurisdictions have found
their clients and themselves subject to numerous and occasionally conflicting legal obligations. 2 For an attorney licensed to
practice in multiple jurisdictions, performing services for
clients with multistate legal interests requires ensuring not
only that the clients' actions conform to all applicable legal
conventions but also that the attorney's own behavior meets
the professional ethical standards of each state in which he
holds a license to practice.
Occasionally, however, an attorney licensed in more than
one state will find it impossible to conform her behavior to the
ethical requirements of each of the states in which she holds
a license. 3 Where an attorney's ethical obligations directly conflict, the courts, legislatures, and commentators have provided
little help in supplying a meaningful standard by which to
resolve these ethical dilemmas. 4 At present, a majority of
states have adopted some form of the American Bar Association's (ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model
Rules), and a significant minority of states have adopted some
version of the ABA's Model Code of Professional Responsibility
(Model Code). 5 The Model Code contains no provision that
deals explicitly with choice of law,6 and the Model Rules did
not contain such a provision until the amendment of Model
Rule 8.5 in August 1993. 7 As this Note will show, however, the
recent amendment to the Model Rules offers little predictive
clarity for the multistate practitioner whose ethical obligations
conflict.

2.
See Committee on Counsel Responsibility, Risks of Violation of Rules of
Professional Responsibility by Reason of the Increased Disparity Among the States, 45
Bus. LAW. 1229, 1229-30 (1990); O'Brien, supra note 1, at 678 & n.2; see also Leis v.
Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 449-50 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing the changing
nature oflegal practice); cf. William F. Baxter, Choice ofLaw and the Federal System,
16 STAN. L. REV. 1, 1 (1963) (citing increased personal and business activities
conducted without regard to the existence of state boundaries, as well as changes in
the rules governing in personam jurisdiction, as creating a growing strain on the
choice-of-law system).
3.
E.g., Developments in the Law-Lawyers' Responsibilities and Lawyers' Responses, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1547, 1585 (1994) [hereinafter Developments].
4.
O'Brien, supra note 1, at 681.
5.
Developments, supra note 3, at 1582.
6.
See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1981).
7.
Compare MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.5(b) (1994) with
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.5 (1983).
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This Note proposes a client-based approach to resolving
choice-of-law problems in the area of professional responsibility for attorneys licensed to practice in multiple jurisdictions.
Specifically, this Note addresses conflict-of-law issues that
arise outside of proceedings before a court (nonproceedings) in
the context of the future crime exception 8 to the attorneyclient privilege. Part I discusses amended Model Rule 8.5(b)(2)
as it applies to situations in which multistate practitioners
participate in nonproceedings. Part II proposes a client-based
choice-of-law rule and demonstrates how that rule would
provide a clearer standard than the Model Rule. Part II also
outlines how the proposed client-based rule advances one of
the underlying policies of the rules of professional responsibility with respect to the attorney-client privilege, focusing on the
types of interests and contacts emphasized by certain modern
choice-of-Jaw approaches. In Part III, this Note outlines a
hypothetical situation that presents a true conflict-a factual
scenario that continues to challenge modern choice-of-law
scholars. Part IV first discusses how Model Rule 8.5 would
apply to the hypothetical situation and how that application
would prove highly problematic. Part IV then applies the
proposed client-based rule to the same hypothetical situation
and demonstrates how that application proves clear and
straightforward. Finally, this Note concludes that the proposed
client-based rule, while not without its limitations, offers a
significant improvement to Model Rule 8.5 and provides a
viable and coherent way of resolving true conflicts of law in
the area of professional responsibility.
I. THE CURRENT CHOICE-OF-LAW PROVISION:
MODEL RULE 8.5(B)(2)

The 1993 amendments to the Model Rules added subsection
(b) to Rule 8.5 to deal with choice-of-law issues in the area of

8.
Depending on the state, this exception either allows or requires the attorney
to disclose her client's intent to commit certain types of crimes in the future. See, e.g.,
DEL. LAWYERS' R. PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1995) (allowing attorneys to
exercise judgment in deciding whether to disclose client's intentions, even if likely to
result in "imminent death or substantial bodily harmn); N.J. R. PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1994) (requiring attorneys to disclose client's intentions that
might result in damage to life, limb, or property).
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professional responsibility. 9 Where attorneys act outside of
court proceedings, Model Rule 8.5(b)(2)(ii) provides:
if the lawyer is licensed to practice in this and another
jurisdiction, the rules to be applied shall be the rules
of the admitting jurisdiction in which the lawyer principally practices; provided, however, that if particular
conduct clearly has its predominant effect in another
jurisdiction in which the lawyer is licensed to practice,
the rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied to that
conduct. 10

Neither the correct interpretation nor application of this
Model Rule proves to be instantly clear. First, the Model Rule
provides no guidelines to interpret the "principally practices"
standard. One reasonably could define this phrase by the
percentage of an attorney's clients domiciled in a given jurisdiction, the amount of the attorney's work performed in relation to the laws of a given jurisdiction, or the portion of an
attorney's time devoted to projects involving the laws or
clients of a given jurisdiction. Furthermore, an attorney could
conceivably spend precisely equal amounts of time in more
than one jurisdiction. Given these competing, yet reasonable,
interpretations of the phrase "principally practices," Model
Rule 8.5(b) appears susceptible to significant manipulation.
Second, one would face additional difficulty in understanding the "predominant effect" exception. An initial reading
could suggest that Model Rule 8.5(b) focuses exclusively on the
"predominant effect" of the attorney's "particular conduct," 11
yet the comments to the rule suggest otherwise:
The intention is for the [predominant effect] exception to
be a narrow one. It would be appropriately applied, for
example, to a situation in which a lawyer admitted in, and
principally practicing in, State A, but also admitted in
State B, handled an acquisition by a company whose

9.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.5(b) & cmts. 2-4 (1994).
10. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.5(b)(2)(ii) (1994) (emphasis
added).
11. Since the Model Rules are aimed at influencing attorneys' behavior, the
drafters probably intended the rule's language to refer to actions by attorneys. One
commentary seems to have assumed as much since it fails to mention this source of
potential ambiguity. See Deuelopments, supra note 3, at 1588-90.

WINTER 1995) Professional Responsibility and Choice of Law 463

headquarters and operations were in State B of another,
similar such company. The exception would not appropriately be applied, on the other hand, if the lawyer handled
an acquisition by a company whose headquarters and
operations were in State A of a company whose headquarters and main operations were in State A, but which also
had some operations in State B. 12
Despite somewhat confusing language, the commentary clearly
would apply the "predominant effect" exception to the following instance: the lawyer is admitted to practice in both States
A and B; she principally practices in State A; she is retained
by a company that operates and has its headquarters in State
B; and that company wishes to acquire another company that
also operates and has its headquarters in State B. The commentary would not apply the predominant effect exception,
however, to the same scenario if both companies operated and
had headquarters in State A with only minor operations in
State B. Yet the commentary offers no further explanation for
its application of the "predominant effect" exception to only
the first situation. The commentary gives no indication whether it applies in the former instance because the attorney's
"particular conduct" occurs with respect to the laws of State B
or because the client's "particular conduct" takes place in that
state. One could reasonably read Model Rule 8.5 and its
accompanying comments either way.
The "predominant effect" language poses additional confusion. Imagine a situation involving the future crime exception
to the attorney-client privilege. 13 The attorney holds licenses
from both state X, which recognizes the future crime exception, and state Z, which does not recognize any exceptions to
the attorney-client privilege. Suppose also that the attorney
learns that a client, a resident of state X, intends to defraud
a partnership that operates under the laws of state X but
whose partners are all domiciliaries of state Z. In this case, it
is unclear whether the attorney's conduct would have its predominant effect in state X, where the partnership operates, or
in state Z, where the impact of the financial injury would be
felt by the individual partners.

12.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.5 cmt. 4 (1994).
13.
Compare DEL. LAWYERS' R. PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1995) with N.J.
R. OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1994).
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The interpretation of the "predominant effect" exception will
have profound impacts on the attorney's conduct. If the attorney's conduct were deemed to have its predominant effect in
state X because state X had licensed the attorney, provided
the legal residence of the partnership, and was the domicile of
the client, then the ethical rules of state X would require the
attorney to disclose his client's criminal intent. If, on the other
hand, the attorney's conduct were determined to have its
predominant effect in state Z because state Z also had licensed
the attorney and because the actual economic harm would be
suffered by partners who are domiciliaries of state Z, then the
professional responsibility regulations of state Z would prohibit the attorney's disclosure of his client's intent. Thus, while
interpretation of the "predominant effect" exception has obvious ramifications for the multistate practitioner, Model Rule
8.5 lacks sufficient clarity to guide its application.
One commentary has proposed elimination of the "predominant effect" exception as a partial solution to the ambiguity in
Model Rule 8.5(b). 14 That commentary focuses on the referential ambiguity of the "predominant effect" exception, noting
that Model Rule 8.5 does not clarify whether the exception
clause applies to the effect of the attorney's conduct on the
client or on the public. 15 In the context of the future crime
exception to the attorney-client privilege, the referential ambiguity may prove determinative.
Consider the following situation. A client, domiciled in state
X, intends to commit a crime in state Z, and he discloses that
intention to his attorney, who is licensed to practice in both
states. If state X would forbid disclosure while state Z would
require it, in which state would the predominant effect of the
attorney's conduct occur? This determination will be important
to the attorney who seeks to avoid being disciplined for violating the attorney-client privilege in state X. Without further
specificity, applying the Model Rule's exception proves difficult. Although subsequent case law may eventually eliminate
the ambiguity, the Model Rule at present lacks sufficient
clarity to guide the conduct of multistate practitioners. 16
Although the cited commentary makes an important observation, it accurately notes that its own proposed test "also

14.
15.
16.

Developments, supra note 3, at 1588-90.
Id. at 1588.
See id.
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presents some ambiguity" and does little to further the goal of
establishing a clear choice-of-law rule. 17 Elimination of the
"predominant effect" exception would still leave the equally
ambiguous and problematic "principally practices" standard of
general application. The justification for the elimination of the
"predominant effect" exception is that it would provide increased ex ante certainty18 but this reasoning is circular. The
adoption of any coherent choice-of-law rule will yield the same
ex ante certainty as any other such rule, provided that the rule
subsequently is applied with uniformity. 19 Model Rule 8.5(b)
fails as a satisfactory rule because its intrinsic ambiguities
preclude consistent interpretation and, consequently, uniform
application. Although certainty might evolve during the adjudication of cases brought under Model Rule 8.5(b), relying on
case-by~case analysis to clarify the rule would defeat the
purpose of adopting any bright-line rule at all. 20

II. A CLIENT-BASED APPROACH TO
THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROBLEM

In light of the ambiguities contained in Model Rule 8.5 and
the lack of any choice-of-law provision in the Model Code, this
Note proposes a client-based rule for the nonproceeding situation contemplated by Model Rule 8.5(b)(2)(ii). Where a
multistate practitioner acts outside of a court proceeding, and
where a true conflict of law arises as to the scope of the attorney-client privilege, this Note advocates applying the law
of the state in which the client is domiciled at the time the
potentially disclosable communication occurs.
The proposed client-based rule offers several advantages.
First, it provides a clearer standard than amended Model Rule
8.5(b)(2)(ii). The clarity of the client-based rule likely will
result in a degree of certainty and uniformity that will give
meaning and substance to the attorney-client privilege. 21

17. Id. at 1589.
18. See id.
19. See Baxter, supra note 2, at 2-4 (distinguishing between primary and secondary certainty).
20. See, e.g., Developments, supra note 3, at 1588-89.
21. See generally Steven Bradford, Conflict of Laws and the Attorney-Client
Privilege: A Territorial Solution, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 909, 943-51 (1991) (discussing
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This certainty arguably is threatened by the dependence of
the client-based rule on the potentially difficult-to-apply concept of "domicile," which may itself be a problematic factor,
given its technical nature. 22 Although one rightfully may attack
the intricacies that sometimes impede a clear determination
of a person's domicile, our legal system tolerates the concept
and relies upon it in many areas of law. 23 The continued use
of the domicile concept suggests that courts and scholars have
become sufficiently comfortable with its operation so that its
future application will not prove unduly burdensome or problematic. To use the attack on domicile, without more, to reject
the client-based rule would be to call into question many areas
of the law that similarly rely on a determination of domicile for
their effective enforcement.
Second, the client-based rule advances one of the primary
objectives of the attorney-client privilege-protection of the
client. 24 Despite mixed historical rationales, modern commentators justify the attorney-client privilege as the sine qua non
of the adversarial system. 25 One commentator has written:
The attorney-client privilege may well be the pivotal
element of the modern American lawyer's professional
functions. It is considered indispensable to the lawyer's
function as advocate on the theory that the advocate can
adequately prepare a case only if the client is free to
disclose everything, bad as well as good. The privilege is

the need for a rule that promotes greater certainty and predictability than case-bycase adjudication in the area of attorney-client privilege); O'Brien, supra note 1, at
714, 720-21 (discussing the goals of certainty and predictability advanced by modem
choice-of-law theory).
22. See WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING
CONFLICTS OF LAw 5 (2d ed. 1993) ("Determining domicile can be a subtle and elusive
task, and the result may easily be one about which reasonable persons-and
judges-might disagree."); id. at 12 ("The flexibility of the concept [of domicile] permits
its manipulation ...."). See generally id. at 5-12 (presenting a summary of the
requirements of domicile).
23. See id. at 5 (noting that domicile is the basis for jurisdiction in divorce and
ordinary civil actions; for taxing incomes and estates; and for determining applicable
law in interstate successions).
24. See generally MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY
SYSTEM 2 (1975) (discussing the need for confidentiality as a procedural safeguard
against error in the search for truth that theoretically underlies the adversary
system); Harry I. Subin, The Lawyer as Superego: Disclosure of Client Confidences to
Prevent Harm, 70 IOWA L. REV. 1091, 1096 (1985) (suggesting that the absence of
confidentiality would sacrifice the client's rights and his individual autonomy).
25. E.g., Bradford, supra note 21, at 913-14.
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also considered necessary to the lawyer's function as
confidential counselor in law on the similar theory that the
legal counselor can properly advise the client what to do
only if the client is free to make full disclosure. 26
The protection afforded by the confidentiality of the attorneyclient privilege allows the client to communicate with his legal
counselor in a manner that will allow the attorney to best
represent her client's interest. The privilege prevents the client
from incriminating himself in front of a court or an adversary,
while allowing his attorney to prepare the best possible representation of the client with the benefit of complete disclosure
of relevant information. In sum, the attorney-client privilege
exists to further the client's interests as a participant in a
system of justice that involves adversarial ethics.
To serve the prophylactic goal of the attorney-client privilege; certainty and predictability prove essential. 27 According
to the Supreme Court,
[l]f the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to be
served, the attorney and client must be able to predict
with some degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be protected. An uncertain privilege, or one
which purports to be certain but results in widely varying
applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege
at all. 28
A bright-line rule promotes greater certainty than case-bycase adjudication because it provides the parties with predict-

26. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on the Attorney·Client
Privilege, 66 CAL. L. REV. 1061, 1061 (1978).
27. See, e.g., Developments, supra note 3, at 1588-89 (noting that "confidentiality
requires certainty to further its goals and purposesn). Departures from a clear rule
that defines the attorney-client privilege in individual cases might seem necessary
or even proper, but the resultant lack of uniformity of the rule's application and
enforcement would produce an uncertainty that would undermine the purposes of the
privilege altogether. See id. Although the clarity of a bright-line rule offers advantages outside of the privilege context, id. (citing Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege:
Fixed Rules, Balancing and Constitutional Entitlement, 91 HARV. L. REV. 464, 468-69
(1977)), the benefits of a bright-line rule in the privilege context prove especially
significant. Bradford, supra note 21, at 912, 937, 945.
28. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981). See also Bradford,
supra note 21, at 943 (arguing that the attorney-client privilege will only foster
communications between the attorney and client if both parties know at the time of
their communications whether and to what extent the privilege will apply).

468

UniveT'Sity of Michigan Journal, of Law R.eform

[VOL. 28:2

ability regarding the future ramifications and treatment of
their present actions. 29
While the client-based rule may protect the client, it sacrifices an important function of the future crime exception-protecting the public interest in deterring intended
crimes. This tension between the interests of the individual
and society at large often exists in the search for a workable
and just legal principle. Without a universally acceptable
normative standard, however, attempting to justify a choice-oflaw rule that favors either the client or the public would
produce interminable debate on the merits of the appropriate
public policy. This Note declines to invite that discussion and
instead recognizes that the current choice-of-law provision
embodied in Model Rule 8.5 presents serious pragmatic difficulties.30 A domicile-centered rule at least focuses on the
client, which is consistent with the policies underlying the
attorney-client privilege and the professional responsibility
regulations. By applying the law of the client's domicile, the
proposed client-based rule provides a more certain, predictable, and rational approach than the existing rule. These
improvements sufficiently justify consideration of the merits
of the proposed client-based rule.
The client-based rule also advances another purpose underlying the rules of professional responsibility: the protection of
the reasonable expectations of the client as a layperson. 31 The
preamble to the Model Rules establishes that the legal profession serves a quasi-governmental function by self-regulation
and that the ethical guidelines exist as a means of protecting
the public interest. 32 In the absence of the judiciary-as when
a lawyer acts in non proceedings-the lawyer has a responsibil-

29.
This so-called "primary predictability" constitutes "a [choice-of-law] goal
worthy of pursuit [that] few would deny." Baxter, supra note 2, at 3. Yet primary
predictability alone "is an inadequate normative basis for traditional choice-of-law
rules." Id. {emphasis added). For a more thorough discussion of the merits of
predictability and uniformity as justifications for choice-of-law rules, see id. at 2-4.
See also Bradford, supra note 21, at 943-51 {discussing the need for a rule that
promotes greater certainty and predictability than case-by-case adjudication in the
area of attorney-client privilege); O'Brien, supra note 1, at 714, 720-21 {discussing .
the goals of certainty and predictability advanced by modern choice-of-law theory).
30.
See supra Part I.
31. See, e.g., FREEDMAN, supra note 24, at 3 {discussing the obligations of a
criminal defense attorney to protect her legally unsophisticated client from the
potential harm of the truth-finding process embodied in criminal trials).
32.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble§§ 8-12 (1994); see also
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-2 (1981).
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ity to the public to provide a certain quality of justice. 33 In
such situations outside the purview of the court, the law of the
client's domicile should apply because it best protects the
reasonable expectations of the client. It is the law with which
the client will most likely be familiar 34 and, accordingly, the
law to which the client will expect to be held accountable. 35
Third, focusing on the client and his domicile is consistent
with the theoretical emphases in certain modern choice-of-law
approaches. Three modern theories prove illustrative. The first
is Professor Currie's governmental interest analysis. 36
Currie based his system upon the observation that law
is purposive in nature-that those who made the law
sought to serve various social goals .... [He] argued, in
choice-of-law decision-making, the governmental interests
of each jurisdiction in having its law applied should be
considered. That procedure helps insure that a law will not
be applied to the problem unless applying the law would
achieve a policy goal sought by the sovereign which promulgated the law. 37
The rationale behind the client-based rule follows Professor
Currie's theoretical instruction. Although, as noted, a consideration of the "governmental interests of each jurisdiction"
reveals a tension between the purpose of the attorney-client
privilege and the policy concerns motivating the future crime
exception, application of the client-based rule clearly does
"achieve a policy goal sought by the sovereign which promulgated the law." Applying the law of the client's domicile furthers the policy of the client's state, allowing that state's laws
to serve their intended "social goals."

33.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble § 1 (1994) {providing
that a "lawyer is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a
public citizen having special responsibility for the quality ofjustice"); cf MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-5 (1981) {stating that "[b]ecause of [a
lawyer's] position in society ... respect for the law should be more than a platitude").
34. See, e.g., Bernkrant v. Fowler, 360 P.2d 906, 910 {Cal. 1961) {"Unless [the
parties] could rely on their own law, they would have to look to the laws of all of the
jurisdictions to which [the other party] might move regardless of where he was
domiciled .... ").
35. See HERBERT F. GoODRICH, HANDBOOK OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 261-62 {3d
ed. 1949).
36.
For a complete introduction to Professor Currie's governmental interest
analysis, see Brainerd Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of
Laws, 1959 DUKE L.J. 171.
37.
RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 22, at 212.
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The client-based rule also applies the type of tie-breaking
analysis advanced in Professor Baxter's comparative impairment approach. 38 Professor Baxter recognizes two types of
governmental objectives: internal and external. 39 Where a
choice-of-law problem arises, "the external objective of one
state must be subordinated [to that of the other]."40 Essentially, "[t]he principle is to subordinate, in the particular case,
the external objective of the state whose internal objective will
be least impaired in general scope and impact by subordination in cases like the one at hand."41
The client-based rule contemplates the type of comparative
impairment approach suggested by Professor Baxter by properly considering the conflicting state objectives with respect to
the attorney-client privilege and the future crime exception. A
comparison of governmental objectives, however, merely uncovers the conflicting policies of the attorney-client privilege
and the future crime exception. The client-based rule advances
the underlying, client-protective purpose of the attorney-client
privilege and of the professional responsibility regulations. In
other words, the client-based rule reflects the conclusion that
the objectives of both the attorney-client privilege and the
professional responsibility regulations would be impaired more
than the policy goals of the future crime exception if the
client-based rule were not applied. While one may dispute the
merits of this conclusion on normative grounds, the proposed
client-based rule does incorporate the type of comparative
impairment analysis that Professor Baxter recommended to
resolve conflicts of law.
The client-based rule also contemplates the analytical focus
of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. The Second
Restatement's approach involves a two-step process. 42 First, a

38. For a detailed introduction to comparative impairment, see Baxter, supra
note 2.
39. Internal objectives represent those governmental goals that motivate a
state's approach to resolving conflicts among private interests. Id. at 17. These
interests exist even in wholly domestic disputes. Id. External governmental objectives
arise when a transaction affects persons of different states. Id. "They are the
objectives of each state to make effective, in all situations involving persons as to
whom it has responsibility for legal ordering, that resolution of contending private
interests the state has made for local purposes.• Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 18. Another commentary has restated Professor Baxter's proposition:
"true conflicts [of law] could be resolved by comparing the extent of impairment of
each state's policy and applying the law whose policy would be most impaired if it
were not applied." RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 22, at 221.
42. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1988).

WINTER 1995) Professional Responsibility and Choice of Law 471

court, subject to constitutional restrictions, should apply a
statutory choice-of-law rule, if one exists. 43 In the absence of
such a statutory directive, the Second Restatement in effect
prescribes application of the law of the state that has "the
most significant relationship" with the situation presented. 44
The determination of the most significant relationship involves
consideration of seven factors, 45 which "can be organized into
three basic topics: governmental interests, party interests, and
interests involving the administration of justice. "46
Application of the client-based rule entails consideration of
the types of interests examined under the framework of the
Second Restatement. Analyzing the governmental and party
interests in a conflicts situation, one finds the previously
described dilemma posed by the competing purposes of the
attorney-client privilege and the future crime exception; the
former protects the client, a party interest, but the latter
protects the public, a governmental interest. Although applying the law of the client's domicile sacrifices the concern of the
future crime exception in order to advance the purposes of the
attorney-client privilege and the professional responsibility
regulations, the client-based rule furthers the goals of certainty and predictability and is relatively easy to administer. The
justification for the rule thus reflects proper attention to the
types of interests emphasized by the Second Restatement.
Finally, the client-based rule offers an additional advantage
in that the rule prevents the legally sophisticated client from
manipulating applicable ethical regulations to the client's
advantage by forum shopping. Commentators often have
manifested a concern that manipulative efforts of legally

43.
44.
45.

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)

(g)

Id. § 6(1).
RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 22, at 195.

The factors are:
the needs of the interstate and international systems,
the relevant policies of the forum,
the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests
of those states in the determination of the particular issue,
the protection of justified expectations,
the basic policies underlying the particular field oflaw,
certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS§ 6(2) (1988).
46.
RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 22, at 196.
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sophisticated parties could frustrate an imprudent choice-oflaw standard because these parties simply would bring suit in
a jurisdiction whose laws would favor the desired outcome. 47
In the context of nonproceedings, forum shopping continues
to present a concern. Consider, for example, an alternative to
the client-based rule, application of the law of the state that
licenses the attorney. For a multistate practitioner, the lawyer
could simply designate a "home-base" state from among the
states in which she is licensed. So long as the attorney made
adequate ex ante disclosure, the parties could rely on application
of the laws of the home-base state to their interactions, and
legally sophisticated clients could choose lawyers based on the
applicable state ethical codes. A client could choose a lawyer
whose home-base state has a narrow future crime exception in
order to avoid the burden of the broader future crime exception
imposed by the state in which the client is domiciled, 48 thus
escaping the laws that the legislature of his state has enacted.
The client-based rule would not encourage such manipulative
behavior, because the client would properly remain subject to
the laws of the state in which he was domiciled.

III. WHERE THE PROPOSED STANDARD MIGHT APPLY:
A NOT-SO-HYPOTHETICAL CONFLICT OF LAW
This Part outlines a hypothetical situation, analyzing the
application of the statutes of two states, Delaware and New
Jersey, in which the client's disclosure implicates the future

47. See, e.g., id. at 219 (noting that pure interest analysis as a choice-of-law
method would encourage forum-shopping) (citing Michael Traynor, Conflict of Laws:
Professor Currie's Restrained and Enlightened Forum, 49 CAL. L. REV. 845 (1961)).
But see Bradford, supra note 21, at 951 (arguing that state ethical obligations are
unlikely to influence a client's choice of attorney).
48. This option becomes especially threatening in light of states like Maryland,
whose ethics committee has declared that an attorney's conduct in a foreign jurisdiction
will be considered "ethical per sen ifthe attorney conforms to the Code of Professional
Responsibility of that foreign jurisdiction. See Developments, supra note 3, at 1587
(citing Md. Comm. on Ethics, Informal Op. 86-28, at 3 (1985)). In other words, if an
attorney chose Maryland as her "home-base,n she could avoid sanctions by the Maryland
Committee on Ethics simply by conforming her conduct to the ethical regulations of
any foreign jurisdiction in which she practiced, regardless of whether she was licensed
by that foreign jurisdiction. A client could not, therefore, rely on the application of
Maryland's professional responsibility regulations to the attorney's conduct. This
uncertainty could undermine the client's ability to predict and plan around the
attorney's future conduct.
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crime exception to the attorney-client privilege. In the Delaware-New Jersey hypothetical, the attorney is licensed to
practice in both states. 49 The client is domiciled in Delaware
and reveals his intention to defraud a corporate secured
creditor in New Jersey. 50 Both Delaware and New Jersey have
substantially identical statutes that designate such fraud as
a crime. 51 In addition, Delaware and New Jersey both have
adopted some version of the Model Rules, 52 though the adopted
versions differ as to the scope and terms of the future crime
exception.
In Delaware, Model Rule 1.6 generally prohibits attorneys
from disclosing client confidences without client consent. 53 The
future crime exception is limited and discretionary, providing
that "[a] lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the
lawyer reasonably believes necessary ... to prevent the client
from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is
likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily
harm." 54 Delaware's rule implicitly endorses a state policy that
favors client confidences over threats to public safety that do
not involve life or limb.
One should note two characteristics of Delaware's future
crime exception. First, the lawyer may only disclose her client's criminal intent where the contemplated criminal act, in
the lawyer's opinion, would likely result in "imminent death
or substantial bodily harm." Delaware thus absolutely prohibits its lawyers from disclosing their client's criminal intentions
49. The hypothetical intentionally involves an attorney who is admitted to practice, either regularly or pro hac vice, in both jurisdictions to avoid the important, but
distinct, jurisdictional difficulties in determining which state would have proper
jurisdiction to discipline the attorney. By licensing the attorney in both Delaware and
New Jersey, the jurisdictional question is properly avoided, as it is beyond the scope
of this Note.
50. One might challenge the general relevance of the client-based rule, because
this Note only tests its application to a specific hypothetical scenario. The clientbased rule would likely encounter significant difficulty in resolving a conflicts
situation in which a multistate practitioner has several clients from numerous
domiciles who together intend to commit a conspiratorial crime or fraud. Although
this situation would pose a significant challenge to the viability of the client-based
rule, such a scenario seems sufficiently unlikely so as to justify postponement of its
consideration.
51. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 891 (Supp. 1994) with N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:21-12 (West 1982).
52. Compare DEL. LAWYERS' R. PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT with N.J. R. PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT.
53. DEL. LAWYERS' R. PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule l.6(a) (1995).
54. DEL. LAWYERS' R. PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule l.6(b)(l) (1995) (emphasis
added).
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if those intentions would not result in damage to a person's
life or limb. 55 Second, even if the client's intended acts would
endanger life or limb, the rule is discretionary and allows the
attorney licensed to practice in Delaware to exercise her
judgment in deciding whether to· disclose her client's intentions.
Like Delaware, New Jersey imposes a general prohibition on
attorneys' disclosure of client confidences. 56 New Jersey's
future crime exception, however, is mandatory and broader in
scope, providing that
[a) lawyer shall reveal such information . . . as soon as,
and to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary, to prevent the client ... from committing a criminal,
illegal or fraudulent act that the lawyer reasonably believes is likely to result in death or substantial bodily
harm or substantial injury to the financial interest or
property of another. 57
Compared to the Delaware rule, New Jersey's rule favors the
state's interest in protecting public safety and private property
over client confidentiality. Consequently, New Jersey requires
its licensed attorneys to disclose client confidences in a broader range of circumstances which pose a threat to life, limb, or
property.
Comparing this rule to Delaware's, one should make two
observations. First, this rule is mandatory. While the New
Jersey rule still allows the lawyer to exercise his judgment in
determining what he "reasonably believes [to be) necessary, to
prevent the client" from committing the enumerated acts, once
the lawyer has made such a determination, he then shall
reveal that information. 58 Unlike the Delaware provision, the
New Jersey rule leaves the lawyer no discretion in deciding
whether to disclose his client's criminal, illegal, or fraudulent
intentions. Second, the scope of the New Jersey future crime
exception is much broader than that of Delaware. The New
Jersey rule requires the lawyer to disclose information that

55.
For example, the Delaware Model Rules of Professional Conduct would not
sanction even discretionary disclosure by an attorney of a client's criminal intentions
where the intended act only threatened property interests. Compare DEL. LAWYERS'
R. PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a) (1995) with DEL. LAWYERS' R. PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b) (1995).
56.
N.J. R. PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a) (1994).
57.
N.J. R. PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule l.6(b)(l) (1994) (emphasis added).
58.
N.J. R. PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule l.6(b)(l) (1994).
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would prevent criminal, illegal, and fraudulent acts that might
result in damage to life, limb, financial interest, or property of
another. In other words, where the Delaware rule would allow
its lawyer to disclose her client's criminal intentions that
might result in injury to life or limb, the New Jersey rule
would require its attorney to disclose his client's intent to
commit a criminal, illegal, or fraudulent act that would result
in damage to life, limb, or property. 69
The Delaware-New Jersey hypothetical consequently presents an apparent true conflict. 60 The relevant interests are
illustrated by the following diagram:
Delaware

New Jersey

Contacts

Attorney's license
Client's domicile

Attorney's license
Future fraud location

Law

Attorney cannot disclose
client's intent

Attorney must disclose
client's intent

Policy

Narrow future crime exception favors greater client
confidentiality, except when
personal injury or human
life is at risk

Broad future crime,
fraud, and illegal activity
exception favors state's
interest in protecting
public safety and private
property interests

Diagram 1 61

59.
Compare DEL. LAWYERS' R. PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1995) with N.J.
R. PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1994).
60.
The late Professor Brainerd Currie outlined the theoretical foundation for a
choice-of-law approach now commonly known as governmental interest analysis. See
Currie, supra note 36. His article identified three situations that posed significant
challenges to courts and choice-of-law scholars. Id. at 171-72. At least one of those
identified situations, the true conflict, remains a source of highly problematic choice-oflaw issues and continues to form the basis for much modern choice-of-law scholarship.
E.g., Leo Kanowitz, Comparative Impairment and Better Law: Grand Rlusions in the
Conflict ofLaws, 30 liAsTINGS L.J. 255 (1978); Herma Hill Kay, The Use ofComparative
Impairment to Resollle True Conflicts: An Evaluation of the California Experience, 68
CAL. L. REV. 577 (1980); Larry Kramer, More Notes on Methods and Objectives in the
Conflict of Laws, 24 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 245 (1991); John J. Wasilczyk, Note, Conflict
of Laws: Choice of Law for True Conflicts, 65 CAL. L. REV. 290 (1977).
A true conflict arises when the laws of more than one state could apply and the
application of the law of any one state would advance the policy of that state. RICHMAN
& REYNOLDS, supra note 22, at 213. Developing a coherent choice-of-law theory that
satisfactorily resolves the true conflict situation, while also avoiding normative value
preferences, has proven the basis for much choice-of-law scholarship, though little
agreement has resulted. See, e.g., Baxter, supra note 2; Currie, supra note 36; Kramer,

supra.
61.

For a discussion of diagramming conflicts-of-law analysis, see William M.

Richman, Diagramming Conflicts: A Graphic Understanding of Interest Analysis, 43
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Application of Delaware's law would advance the policy of
Delaware's narrow future crime exception, which entitles the
client to confidential communications unless that client's
criminal intentions pose a risk of imminent death or substantial bodily harm. 62 Conversely, New Jersey's law, if applied, would further New Jersey's broad future crime, fraud,
and illegal activity exception that favors the state's interest in
protecting public safety and private property over the client's
interest in confidential communications. 63 Delaware's policy
seeks to protect its client-domiciliary by preserving client
confidentiality,64 while New Jersey's policy aims at protecting
the property interests that are threatened by the client's
intended and illegal act. 65
IV. RESOLVING THE CONFLICT POSED BY THE
DELAWARE-NEW JERSEY HYPOTHETICAL

A. Applying Model Rule 8.5
As the discussion in Part I indicated, Model Rule 8.5(b)(2)
emphasizes two criteria in making the choice-of-law determination. The rule relies exclusively on where the lawyer principally practices and where the predominant effect of particular
conduct occurs. 66 The rules of the jurisdiction in which the
lawyer principally practices will apply unless the predominant
effect occurs in another jurisdiction, in which case the rules of
that jurisdiction will apply. 67 Given the interests in the hypothetical, the following permutations appear:

OHIO ST. L.J. 317 (1982); Joseph W. Singer, A Pragmatic Guide to Conflicts, 70 B.U.
L. REV. 731 (1990).
62.
See DEL. LAWYERS' R. PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1995).
63.
See N.J. R. PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1994).
64.
See DEL. LAWYERS' R. PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 cmt. (1995).
65.
See N.J. R. PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(l) (1994).
66.
See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.5(b)(2)(ii) (1994).
67.
Id. For a discussion of the rule's potential ambiguities, see supra Part I.
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1)
2)
3)

4)

Principally
Practice

Predominant
Effect

Rules Applied

Delaware
Delaware
New Jersey
New Jersey

Delaware
New Jersey
New Jersey
Delaware

Delaware
New Jersey
New Jersey
Delaware

Table I

Consider how Model Rule· 8.5(b){2)(ii) would apply to the
Delaware-New Jersey hypothetical. As noted in Part I, it
initially would be difficult even to determine where the lawyer
principally practiced. Let us assume, however, that a lawyer
is deemed to practice principally in the state where most of
his clients are domiciled or incorporated. 68 Let us also assume
that, for the purposes of the hypothetical, that state is Delaware, thus confining the analysis to rows one and two of
Table 1.
In the Delaware-New Jersey hypothetical, the fraud will
take place in New Jersey. This occurrence might mean that,
under Model Rule 8.5(b)(2)(ii), the lawyer's conduct would
have its predominant effect in New Jersey. If so, then the
analysis in row two of Table 1 would apply the rules of New
Jersey to the Delaware-New Jersey hypothetical. The future
occurrence of a fraud in New Jersey arguably would justify the
application of New Jersey's rules to a transaction between a
Delaware domiciliary and a lawyer licensed by both Delaware
and New Jersey.
Recalling the language of Model Rule 8.5(b)(2)(ii), however,
one must ask whether New Jersey, as the future site of an
illegal act, qualifies as the jurisdiction in which the "particular conduct clearly has its predominant effect"69-assuming,
albeit problematically, 70 that the client's conduct constitutes
the "particular conduct" in question for the purpose of the
Model Rule. If so, then the analysis in row two of Table 1
still indicates that New Jersey's rules will apply and that, as

68. This standard may prove both unworkable and unrealistic. Some standard,
however, is necessary to test the plausibility of Model Rule 8.5, and the chosen one
seems as plausible as the other methods suggested in Part I.
69.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.5(b)(2)(ii) (1994) (emphasis added).
70. For a discussion of the ambiguity of the "particular conductn phrase, see
supra Part I.
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a consequence, the lawyer in the hypothetical will be required
to disclose his client's intentions "to the proper authorities."71
By making that disclosure, however, the lawyer in the
Delaware-New Jersey hypothetical conceivably would be
breaching his obligations under the Delaware rules if he
considered Delaware to be the jurisdiction in which his "particular conduct clearly has its predominant effect," because it
would be that jurisdiction that would discipline him for his
breach of conduct. 72 By this analysis, row one of Table 1
indicates that Model Rule 8.5(b)(2)(ii) would apply the rules of
Delaware to the situation envisioned by the Delaware-New
Jersey hypothetical. Consequently, the lawyer would be forbidden from disclosing his client's intent to defraud a New Jersey
corporate secured creditor. As this example illustrates, determining which state's rules will apply thus depends on how the
predominant effect exception is interpreted-a task that is not
adequately informed by Model Rule 8.5. 73
Part I referred to one commentary that recommended eliminating the "predominant effect" exception and applying the
rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer principally practices. 74 Adopting that recommendation, however, seems to
produce potentially inequitable results. If one were to adopt a
careless method of determining where a lawyer is deemed
principally to practice, the applicable law conceivably could
vary, even though much of the underlying substance of the
transaction in the Delaware-New Jersey hypothetical would
remain the same. The hypothetical situation would still involve a Delaware client who intends to commit a fraud in New
Jersey, but the applicable law would depend on where the
lawyer is deemed principally to practice-a determination that
the client might never know and that the lawyer might find
difficult, if not impossible, to make.

71.
N.J. R. PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b) (1994).
72.
This perspective assumes that the Model Rule intends to refer to the lawyer's
particular conduct, which may not necessarily be the case. For a discussion of this
ambiguity, see supra Part I.
73.
See Deuelopments, supra note 3, at 1588-90.
74. Id.
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B. Applying the Client-Based Rule
Although Model Rule 8.5 involves significant pragmatic
difficulties when applied to the Delaware-New Jersey hypothetical, the client-based rule offers a simple and straightforward alternative; it requires the application of Delaware law
since the client is domiciled in that state. Consequently,
Delaware's Model Rule 1.6 would forbid the attorney from
disclosing his client's intent to perpetrate a fraud on a corporate secured creditor in New Jersey.
Although application of the client-based rule proves unproblematic, its result in the Delaware-New Jersey hypothetical
raises some important and valid concerns. Application of Delaware's law results in New Jersey's interest in public safety and
private property-which probably motivated New Jersey's
passage of its broad future crime and illegal activity exception-being subordinated to Delaware's interest in nearly
absolute client confidentiality. Again, one encounters the conflict between the interests of the individual (the client) and the
interests of the public. 75
The proposed client-based i:ule is not an uncontroversial
solution to the choice-of-law problems which confront the
multijurisdictional practitioner. As noted, the tension between
the individual and society at large always exists in the search
for a workable and just legal principle. Deciding which interest
ought to prevail proves impossible without passing normative
judgment on the merits of either side, a determination beyond
the scope of this Note.
Model Rule 8.5, however, presents significant practical difficulties that could produce inequitable results. The client-based
rule, by focusing on the client, furthers one of the policies
underlying the professional responsibility regulations. More
importantly, however, applying the law of the client's domicile
is more certain, predictable, and rational than the existing rule.
While the client-based rule does not represent the singular
solution to the choice-of-law problems facing multijurisdictional practitioners, the improvements offered by the client-based
rule-increased certainty, predictability, and rationality-justify
consideration of its merits.

75.

See supra Part II.
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CONCLUSION

This Note has proposed a choice-of-law rule as an alternative to Model Rule 8.5(b)(2)(ii). The proposed client-based rule
eliminates the ambiguity of the Model Rule and provides
greater certainty and predictability. In addition, the clientbased rule furthers the purposes of the attorney-client privilege, one of the primary goals of the professional responsibility
regulations, and focuses on the types of interests and contacts
emphasized by at least three modern choice-of-law approaches.
Yet, despite these advantages, even the proposed client-based
rule demonstrates that "any rule of choice of law, like any
other common law rule, represents an accommodation of
conflicting values. "76 One state's policies must invariably yield
to those of another. In the choice-of-law world of the second
best, however, this Note offers a significant improvement to
the present rule and provides a plausible and rational method
of resolving true conflicts of law among state professional
responsibility regulations for multistate practitioners.

76.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) ON CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6

cmt. c (1971).

